Tool qualification considerations for tools supporting STPA by Krauss, Sven Stefan et al.
 Procedia Engineering  128 ( 2015 )  15 – 24 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
1877-7058 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of STAMP EU 2015
doi: 10.1016/j.proeng.2015.11.500 
ScienceDirect
3rd European STAMP Workshop, STAMP EU 2015 
Tool qualification considerations for tools supporting STPA 
Sven Stefan Kraussa,*, Martin Rejzeka, Christian Hilbesa 
aZHAW Zurich University of Applied Sciences, 8401Winterthur, Switzerland 
 
Abstract 
We evaluated tool qualification requirements for hazard and risk analysis software tools, particularly for tools supporting System-
Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), and compared the tool qualification approaches of safety standards IEC 61508, EN 50128, 
DO-178C/DO-330 and ISO 26262. Our software tool SAHRA integrates STPA in an existing engineering toolchain by providing 
an extension for the UML/SysML modeling tool Sparx Systems Enterprise Architect. We found that the qualification of this tool 
according to the mentioned safety standards was not straightforward and required further analysis. Therefore, we analyzed the tool 
risks and found that those depend on many factors such as process risks, risks from tool errors, tool integration risks and operational 
scenarios regarding the use of the tool in the development lifecycle. We selected four operational scenarios for tools supporting 
STPA to evaluate tool qualification requirements. After concluding that a tool qualification is required, we used a multi-domain 
tool qualification development lifecycle guided by DO-330 for SAHRA. 
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1. Introduction 
Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a modern hazard analysis technique developed by Leveson [1] and  
based on the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) accident model [2]. A hazard analysis with 
STPA begins with the definition of system accidents, hazards, high-level safety constraints and the construction of a 
hierarchical control structure, which shows how controllers and controlled processes interact via control actions and 
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feedback mechanisms. Based on the hierarchical control structure, unsafe control actions are identified (STPA Step 
1). This information can be used to specify detailed safety constraints and safety requirements. For each unsafe control 
action, the causal scenarios are determined (STPA Step 2): how and what could cause the unsafe control action, or 
how and what causes the control action not being followed or executed properly. This information can then be used 
to identify controls and  mitigations for the accident scenarios [1]. 
There are a number of software tools that support hazard analysis with STPA: A-STPA [3] and its successor 
XSTAMPP [4], based on Eclipse and developed as open source tools at the University of Stuttgart, Germany; 
SafetyHAT, a tool based on Microsoft Access and developed at the Volpe, The National Transportation Systems 
Center, USA [5]; an Eclipse-based STPA tool under development at MIT, USA [6]; SAHRA [7], a development of 
the Safety-Critical Research Lab of Zurich University of Applied Sciences (ZHAW), described later in this paper. 
In cooperation with an industrial partner, the Safety-Critical Systems Research Lab of ZHAW evaluates the 
integration of STPA into our partner’s engineering lifecycle in order to promote safety-guided design. Our industrial 
partner is a system components supplier for industrial, railway and defense applications. The main objective of our 
applied research project is the integration of STPA as a safety analysis method in our partner’s engineering 
development lifecycle, by a) performing an industrial case study to show how STPA can be applied for system 
components engineering in multiple safety domains (confidential), and b) the development and integration of an STPA 
tool in the partner’s engineering toolchain based on the experience gained from the case study and previous STPA 
projects [8], [9] and [10]. 
In this paper we present the approach we followed to integrate STPA in our partner’s toolchain, and discuss the 
risks that are related to the integration of STPA. We introduce our software tool SAHRA and discuss risks related to 
using tools for STPA. For this task, we identified 4 operational scenarios for tools supporting STPA and evaluated the 
tool qualification requirements in multiple safety domains. An overview of this evaluation is given later in the paper. 
Finally, we present the tool qualification approach for our software tool SAHRA. 
 
Nomenclature 
EA Enterprise Architect 
SAHRA STPA based Hazard and Risk Analysis 
STAMP System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes 
STPA System-Theoretic Process Analysis 
SysML System Modelling Language 
TCL Tool Confidence Level 
TD Tool Error Detection 
TI Tool Impact 
TQL Tool Qualification Level 
UML Unified Modelling Language 
 
2. An integrated STPA tool: SAHRA (STPA based Hazard and Risk Analysis) 
In order to enable a safety-guided design, we suggest that requirements engineering and system, hardware and 
software engineering should be tightly coupled with STPA (see Fig. 1). Safety constraints and safety requirements 
must be provided to requirements engineering in order to specify detailed safety requirements and manage trace data 
to the analysis results. Requirements and trace data are the keys for ensuring safe design, verification, validation and 
modification. Requirements, safety constraints, risk control measures, and risk mitigation measures must be provided 
to system, hardware or software engineering in order to take appropriate design decisions, to create new designs or to 
modify existing designs until there are no unacceptable risks left [1]. 
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Fig. 1. Tightly coupled requirement driven design and safety-guided design visualized as hierarchical control structure. 
The main risks for the development of safety-critical systems are: (L1)  safety constraints and safety requirements 
are not provided or provided too late either to the system, hardware and software engineering when needed for design 
or to requirements engineering when needed for requirements specification; (L2) risk control measures and risk 
mitigation measures are not provided or provided too late to the system, hardware and software engineering when 
needed to make design decisions; (L3) trace data is incomplete or incorrect when performing change impact analysis 
for modifications. 
To minimize the possibility of introducing human errors, engineering tools should be integrated. Tools are 
integrated if they work co-operatively, such that the outputs from one tool have a suitable content and format for 
automatic input to a subsequent tool, thus minimizing the possibility of introducing human error in the reworking of 
intermediate results [11]. 
For the integration of an STPA tool into our partner’s engineering toolchain, we had to consider a number of 
constraints: (1) The STPA tool should be integrated into the existing toolchain, which is mainly based on the 
commercial UML/SysML modeling tool Enterprise Architect (EA) from Sparx Systems [12] used for requirements 
engineering and for system and software design; (2) Manual data export and import with external tools should be 
avoided; (3) tool qualification requirements should be considered when the tool is used for the development of safety-
critical system components in industrial, railway, aerospace and defense projects. Under the aforementioned 
constraints, we decided to develop an extension called SAHRA (STPA based Hazard and Risk Analysis) for EA to 
integrate the STPA method directly in an UML/SysML environment (Fig. 2). 
The corporate edition of EA already provides multi-user support with a security permission system, scripting and 
automation API, SQL searches, configuration management integration, report generation, and modeling functionality. 
Our motivation for this approach was that the STPA data is available in the same model repository with requirements 
and design data that allows full end-to-end traceability with requirements and design elements. 
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Fig. 2. Screenshot of the STPA extension SAHRA (STPA based Hazard and Risk Analysis) for Sparx Systems Enterprise Architect. 
SAHRA comes with a special MDG (Model Driven Generation) profile for STPA based on EA’s MDG technology 
[13], which provides additional toolboxes, UML profiles, patterns and templates for STPA modeling [14]. The 
extension provides a context-sensitive object browser and editor for STPA, diagram elements and special editors for 
performing STPA Step 1 and Step 2. The top level architecture of SAHRA is shown in Fig. 3. 
With this approach, we fulfilled the previously mentioned constraints (1) and (2). To fulfill constraint (3), we 
reviewed 4 safety standards to see whether there was any applicable tool qualification requirements, and analyzed 
their potential impact for use and development of software tools supporting STPA: IEC 61508 [15] as a basic safety 
standard that is applicable to all kind of industry, EN 50128 [16] for railway, DO-178C [17] including DO-330 [18] 
for aerospace and defense, and ISO 26262 [19] for the automotive industry. While the first 3 standards are directly 
relevant for the products of our industrial partner, we also included ISO 26262 to review the state of the art of 
automotive tool qualification. The result of this analysis is given later in this paper. 
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Fig. 3. Top level architecture of SAHRA (STBA based Hazard and Risk Analysis) realized as extension for Sparx Systems Enterprise Architect 
to integrate STPA methodology in the engineering toolchain. 
3. Tool Qualification Considerations 
3.1. Overview 
Several safety standards require an assessment of whether an engineering tool might negatively impact safety, as 
malfunctioning engineering tools can introduce errors or fail to detect errors in the final safety-related system. 
Depending on this classification, a tool qualification may be required. In section J of a report by Hayhurst et al. [20] 
about tool qualification according to DO-178B [21], it is stated that a significant number of survey participants who 
qualified their tools found errors during tool qualification; 44% of the participants found errors in development tools 
and 57% found errors in verification tools. The tool errors would not have been detected if the users had not qualified 
their tools. There may be safety risks caused by errors in software tools that can be mitigated by tool qualification. 
In the succeeding sections, we provide a brief overview of tool classification and tool qualification methods. Camus 
et al. [22]  provide more information about this topic. 
3.2. Basic safety standard IEC 61508 
The requirements regarding tools are listed in Part 3, Chapter 7.4.4 of IEC 61508 [24]. The tool classes are defined 
in part 4 of IEC 61508 [23], section 3.2.11 to 3.2.13. Table 1 shows the definition and examples for the tool classes 
T1 to T3. 
For each tool, the user must perform a tool classification to decide the tool class. Depending on the tool class, the 
tool qualification requirements differ. Tools of class T1 do not require further tool qualification measures. Tools of 
classes T2 and T3 require a documentation or specification, which specifies the tool behavior including instructions 
for its use, and requires a risk assessment. Tools of class T3 require tool validation, and for the ones of class T2 tool 
validation is recommended. As an alternative method to tool validation, tool qualification can be based on increased 
confidence from use. 
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Table 1. Tool classes as defined in Part 4 of IEC 61508 [23]. 
Class Definition Examples Ref. 
T1 Tool that generates no outputs that can directly or indirectly 
contribute to the executable code (including data) of the safety 
related system 
Text Editor 
Requirements Management Tool 
Modeling Tool without Code Generation 
Configuration Management Tool 
3.2.11 
T2 Tool that supports the test or verification of the design or 
executable code, where errors in the tool can fail to reveal 
defects but cannot directly create errors in the executable 
software. 
Test Generator 
Code Coverage Tool 
Static Code Analysis Tool 
3.2.12 
T3 Tool that generates outputs that can directly or indirectly 
contribute to the executable code of the safety related system 
Optimizing Compiler 
Compiler with Runtime Package 
3.2.1 
3.3. Railway EN 50128 
The railway tool qualification requirements are listed in Chapter 6.7 of EN 50128 [16]. The tool classes are defined 
in Chapter 3.1.42 to 3.1.43 (Table 2). The tool classes, tool classification and tool qualification requirements are very 
similar to those listed in the basic safety standard IEC 61508 [23]. The main differences are that more tool qualification 
methods and examples are listed. The most important tool qualification methods are: tool validation, confidence from 
use, and other independent error detection means such as diverse redundant code that has the potential to detect tool 
errors as well. 
Table 2. Tool classes as defined in EN 50128 [16]. 
Class Definition Examples Ref. 
T1 Tool that generates no outputs that can directly or indirectly 
contribute to the executable code (including data) of the safety 
related system 
Text Editor 
Requirements Management Tool 
Modeling Tool without Code Generation 
Configuration Management Tool 
3.1.42 
T2 Tool that supports the test or verification of the design or 
executable code, where errors in the tool can fail to reveal 
defects but cannot directly create errors in the executable 
software. 
Test Generator 
Code Coverage Tool 
Static Code Analysis Tool 
3.1.43 
T3 Tool that generates outputs that can directly or indirectly 
contribute to the executable code of the safety related system 
Optimizing compiler 
Compiler with runtime package 
Data/Algorithm compiler 
Tool for changing reference values during operation 
3.1.44 
3.4. Aerospace and Defense DO178C/DO-330 
DO-330 is a supplement to the DO-178C [17] standard dedicated to tool qualification [18]. This supplement 
describes the tool qualification process from a user’s perspective, and includes also a detailed safety tool development 
lifecycle for tool developers. The requirements for tool qualification depend on the tool qualification level (TQL), 
which is built from tool criteria, and the safety level of the software (see Table 3). There are several tables in DO-330 
Annex A [18] that define for each tool qualification level what sections and objectives of the standard are applicable. 
TQL-5 is the lowest level that requires tool validation with requirements based testing where TQL-1 is the highest 
level that demands a compliant tool development process. Qualification for TQL-5 can be done by the tool user, where 
for other levels support of the tool developer is necessary to provide the required tool qualification data. 
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Table 3. Tool criteria and tool qualification level (TQL) per software level according to DO-330 [18]. 
Tool 
Criteria 
Definition Level D Level C Level B Level A 
1 
A tool whose output is part of the airborne software and thus could insert an 
error. 
TQL-4 TQL-3 TQL-2 TQL-1 
2 
A tool that automates verification process(es) and thus could fail to detect an 
error, and whose output is used to justify the elimination or reduction of: 
1. Verification process(es) other than that automated by the tool, or 
2. Development process(es) that could have an impact on the airborne 
software. 
TQL-5 TQL-5 TQL-4 TQL-3 
3 A tool that, within the scope of its intended use, could fail to detect an error. TQL-5 TQL-5 TQL-5 TQL-4 
3.5. Automotive ISO 26262 
The automotive tool qualification requirements are listed in Part 8, Chapter 11 of ISO 26262 [19]. The approach 
for tool classification is rather different from the standards described above; the requirements for tool qualification 
depend on the tool confidence level (TCL), which is built from the tool impact (TI), and the confidence level whether 
an error caused by the tool could be detected or prevented, called tool error detection (TD) (see Table 4). 
Table 4. Tool confidence level built from tool impact (TI) and tool error detection (TD) according to ISO 26262-8 [19] 
Tool Impact  Tool Error Detection   
The possibility that a malfunction of a particular 
software tool can introduce or fail to detect errors in a 
safety-related item or element being developed. 
High confidence to 
prevent/detect erroneous 
outputs 
Medium confidence to 
prevent/detect erroneous 
outputs 
Other cases 
TD1 TD2 TD3 
TI1 shall be selected when there is an 
argument that there is no such 
possibility 
TI1 TCL1 TCL1 TCL1 
TI2 shall be selected in all other cases TI2 TCL1 TCL2 TCL3 
 
The listed tool qualification methods are: (1a) increased confidence from use, (1b) evaluation of the tool 
development process, (1c) validation of the software, and (1d) development according to a safety standard. 
Recommended or highly recommended methods of tool qualification are listed for each automotive safety integrity 
level (ASIL). For the highest safety level ASIL D in combination with tool confidence level TCL3 or TCL2, tool 
validation is highly recommended (i.e. method 1c); alternatively, it is highly recommended to use a tool that has been 
developed according a safety standard (i.e. method 1d). 
There is a remark to method (1d) listed in Tables 4 and 5 in Part 8 of ISO 26262 [19]: “No safety standard is fully 
applicable to the development of software tools. Instead, a relevant subset of requirements of the safety standard can 
be selected.” At the time the standard was published no special tool development standard existed. In the meantime, 
the dedicated tool qualification standard DO-330 from the aerospace domain became available, which can also be 
used for the development of safety-related tools. DO-330 Section 1.2.c explicitly states “This document provides 
guidance for airborne and ground-based software. It may also be used by other domains, such as automotive, space, 
systems, electronic hardware, aeronautical databases, and safety assessment processes” [18]. 
4. Classification of tools supporting STPA 
For a proper tool classification, not only the tool itself should be considered in the risk assessment, but also the 
way in which the tool is integrated and used in the whole toolchain [25]. Asplund [26] adapted STPA and applied it 
to tool integration. In his STPA-based analysis of toolchains, Asplund [27] identified 8 lacking properties as causes 
to risks: Lack of Data Integrity (P1), Lack of Traceability for Completeness and Consistency (P2), Lack of Automated 
Transformations of Data (P3), Lack of Formally Defined Data Semantics (P4), Lack of Possibility to Automate Tool 
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Usage (P5), Lack of Data Mining (P6), Lack of Process Notifications and Process Control (P7), and Lack of Possibility 
to Create Customized GUIs (P8). 
For the preliminary risk assessment, we will use “Lack of Data Integrity” (P1) and “Lack of Traceability for 
Completeness and Consistency” (P2) as an example. A typical STPA tool manages STPA data and can be described 
as a “requirements management tool” or as a “modeling tool without code generation”. When a tool is used for 
managing STPA data, the tool might impose the following risks: (R1) Analysis data (i.e. safety requirements, safety 
constraints, risk control and mitigation measures) is incomplete or corrupt (chapter 2 ėL1, ėL2); (R2) Trace data is 
incomplete or corrupt (chapter 2 ėL3) (e.g., caused by an error in a document generator or the data export function 
or by an inadequately handled file system error in the save function). These tool errors may be difficult to detect, 
depending on the tool operational scenarios, the way the tool is used, and the functionality it provides. 
We identified 4 operational scenarios and evaluated the requirements for tool qualification: 1) STPA data is 
managed in a standalone tool whose output is manually verified for completeness and consistency; 2) STPA data is 
automatically transferred to or integrated into another tool without manual verification; 3) STPA data is used for 
verification like formal model checking; 4) STPA data is used for auto code generation. 
Operational Scenario 1: STPA data is managed in a standalone tool whose output is manually verified for 
correctness and completeness. For this scenario the applicable tool class is T1 for industrial and railway industries; 
for automotive industries, the applicable Tool Confidence Level is TCL1 (T1 for tool impact is selected) and for the 
aerospace industry, a tool qualification is not required. For all standards, no tool qualification is required, but the 
quality assurance process must ensure that no tool output is used without manual verification. 
Operational Scenario 2: STPA data is automatically transferred to or integrated into another tool without manual 
verification (e.g., STPA extension to a modeling tool where data is stored in the model repository). The manual 
verification process for correctness and completeness of the tool output is eliminated or is not possible. For this 
scenario the applicable Tool Confidence Level in automotive is TCL1 to TCL2 depending on the tool’s 
implementation of tool error detection mechanisms (TD1 or TD2) or TCL3 in other cases (TD3). For the aerospace 
industry, tool criteria 2 is selected (the verification process is skipped) and the applicable Tool Qualification Level is 
TQL-3 for level A and TQL-4 for level B to level D. There is no clear guidance in industry and railway standards for 
this case, which suggests the tool class would still be T1 for both domains (T2 would be recommended). 
Operational Scenario 3: STPA data is used for verification (e.g., STPA tool includes a formal model checker). In 
this case the STPA tool is used as a verification tool, which might fail to detect an error. The tool class is: T2 for 
industrial and the railway; TCL1, TCL2 or TCL3 in the automotive industry, depending on error detection methods; 
TQL-4 or TQL-5 for the aerospace industry, depending on the safety level. 
Operational Scenario 4: STPA data is used for auto code generation (e.g., auto code generator uses STPA data like 
a safety control loop and process model to generate code. In this case, the STPA tool is used as code generation tool, 
which might introduce an error in the final safety-related system if there is an error with STPA data. For this type, 
tool classes are: T3 for industrial and railway industries; TCL1, TCL2 or TCL3 in the automotive industry, depending 
on error detection methods; TQL-1, TQL-2 or TQL-3 for the aerospace industry, depending on the safety level. The 
4 operational scenarios and respective classifications are summarized in Table 5. 
Table 5. Classification of tools supporting STPA. 
Operational Scenario IEC61508 EN 50128 ISO 26262 DO-330 
1 T1 T1 TCL1 --- 
2 (T1)|T2 (T1)|T2 TCL1|TCL2|TCL3 TQL-3|TQL-4 
3 T2 T2 TCL1|TCL2|TCL3 TQL-4 
4 T3 T3 TCL1|TCL2|TCL3 TQL-1|TQL-2|TQL-3 
5. Conclusion 
Most of the reviewed standards require tool qualification only for tools that support the software development 
lifecycle (offline support tools). One can argue that when safety analysis tools are used on system level, tool 
qualification requirements are not applicable. We propose that tool risk assessment and tool qualification should not 
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be limited to software lifecycle supporting tools, but should be performed for all engineering tools supporting the 
development of safety-related systems. In particular, safety analysis tools should be qualified, so tool users can rely 
on their correct functionality and outputs.  
We also claim that a tool safety assessment should not only be based on the listed tool criteria and classes, because 
modern tools may have integrated functionality, or the functionality may be integrated in other tools. For example, if 
an STPA tool has a built-in formal model checker, the tool is considered to be a verification tool, which requires tool 
qualification. A systematic view on tool qualification in tool chains is therefore recommended [28]. 
Developers of safety-related software tools should consider whether they use DO-330 as tool development lifecycle 
in order to avoid systematic failures in the tool. This standard includes tool validation, which can be used for tool 
qualification in the other reviewed safety domains. Tool developers of STPA tools should consider whether they 
provide tool qualification packages for their tools, so that tool users can rely on the correct functionality. 
The reviewed standards demand that tool users classify their software tools and perform a risk assessment that 
shows what impact tool error might have on the final safety-critical system. Typical tool qualification methods are: a) 
increased confidence from use by having evidence for an extensive history of satisfactory use; b) tool validation by 
requirements-based testing; c) tool development according to a safety standard. 
SAHRA creates the STPA data in the model repository. In order to enable an efficient use of the tool, manual 
verification steps should be eliminated. This approach fits to the tool operational scenario 2, which requires tool 
qualification. New software tools like SAHRA do not have an extensive history of use and cannot be qualified by 
increased confidence from use. All standards allow tool validation by requirements-based testing as a tool qualification 
method. Users of standalone STPA tools have to ensure that they have a proper manual verification process in place 
that checks the completeness and correctness of the tool output. 
With the software tool SAHRA [7], we were able to integrate STPA in a UML/SysML environment. We used a 
tool development lifecycle guided by DO-330 with TQL-4 as a target level as means to ensure the high quality of the 
integration of our software tool SAHRA and avoid systematic failures during development. We plan to provide a 
multi-domain tool qualification support package including tool operational requirements, pre-defined test cases and 
procedures, reference workflow, and a safety manual. 
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